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T
he Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is
the Federal Reserve System’s principal monetary
policy-making committee.1 At the conclusion of
each FOMC meeting, the Committee issues operating
instructions, known as the “directive,” to the Open
Market Trading Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York.  From 1983 through 1999, these instruc-
tions included a statement about the Committee’s
expectations for future changes in the stance of
monetary policy, in addition to instructions for cur-
rent policy.  The statement pertaining to possible
future policy was known as the “symmetry,” “tilt,” or
“bias,” of the policy directive.  The directive was said
to be symmetric if it indicated that a tightening or an
easing of policy were equally likely in the future.
Otherwise, the directive was said to be asymmetric
toward either tightening or easing.
Since February 1994, the FOMC has publicly
announced changes in current monetary policy
immediately upon making them.  Before May 1999,
public announcements made at the conclusion of
FOMC meetings did not indicate whether the FOMC
had issued an asymmetric directive.  From May to
December 1999, however, announcements following
FOMC meetings included a statement of the Commit-
tee’s expectation about the direction of future policy
action, regardless of whether an action was taken at
that meeting.  This practice attracted considerable
attention and much speculation about how to inter-
pret statements about possible future policy changes.
The Fed has never provided an ofﬁcial interpretation
of these statements.  To help clarify its intentions, the
FOMC established a subcommittee to review both its
policy directive and the public announcement following
FOMC meetings.  In January 2000, the FOMC an-
nounced that the public statement issued at the con-
clusion of future FOMC meetings will indicate any
immediate change in the stance of policy, as well as
the Committee’s assessment of the balance of risks
between heightened inﬂation pressure and economic
weakness over the foreseeable future.  The new lan-
guage, however, is not intended to indicate the likely
direction or the timing of future policy moves.
The January 2000 announcement appears to bring
to a close a distinct period in the history of Federal
Reserve operating procedures.  This article will review
the history and implementation of asymmetry in FOMC
policy directives between 1983 and 1999.  Researchers
and market participants have suggested at least three
interpretations of the FOMC’s use of asymmetric lan-
guage.  One is based on the belief that the FOMC chair-
man has discretion to adjust the stance of policy by
small amounts between FOMC meetings without con-
sulting the full Committee.  An asymmetric directive,
according to this interpretation, granted the chairman
authority to make larger intermeeting policy changes
in the direction speciﬁed by the asymmetric language
than he otherwise was permitted to make.
A second interpretation holds that the issuance
of an asymmetric directive indicated that the FOMC
was more likely to change the stance of policy either
before or at the next FOMC meeting, than if a sym-
metric directive had been issued.  Asymmetric lan-
guage also is thought to have indicated the most
likely direction of the policy action.  Some observers
interpret asymmetry as pertaining just to the inter-
meeting period, while others contend that asymmetry
signaled likely changes in policy at the next FOMC
meeting.  Before 1994, the FOMC often changed its
policy stance between meetings.  Since 1994, however,
it has rarely done so, suggesting a possible change in
the horizon over which asymmetric language pertained.
A third interpretation is that asymmetric direc-
tives primarily were used to build consensus among
the voting FOMC members.  For example, if several
members of the Committee desired to tighten policy
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immediately, but most of the Committee did not, the
members favoring an immediate tightening might have
been more inclined to vote with the majority if the
directive was made asymmetric towards tightening.
Likewise, if some members favored no change, but
the majority preferred to tighten, those preferring no
change might have been more inclined to support an
immediate tightening if the directive was symmetric.  
Of course, these interpretations are not mutually
exclusive.  For example, asymmetric directives would
seem to have been most useful for building consen-
sus if members believed that adopting such language
affected the likelihood of a future change in the
stance of policy.  Indeed, an asymmetric directive
could have been used to form a consensus while at
the same time giving the chairman additional leeway
to change the stance of policy or indicating the likely
direction of the next policy move.
This article attempts to gauge the validity of the
different interpretations of the use of asymmetric
policy directives by investigating the extent to
which they are supported by historical experience.
Speciﬁcally, we examine documentary evidence 
to determine the intent of FOMC members when
asymmetry was ﬁrst introduced into the directive 
in 1983.  We also investigate the extent to which 
the behavior of the FOMC was consistent with any
of these interpretations.
The article has three sections.  The ﬁrst describes
the evolution of the directive between 1983 and
1999, and investigates the intentions of FOMC mem-
bers when asymmetric language was ﬁrst included in
the directive.  The second section presents statistical
evidence concerning the three interpretations of the
asymmetric directive.  The third section presents a
summary and conclusions.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE ASYMMETRIC
POLICY DIRECTIVE
The FOMC policy directive is a general statement
of instructions the Committee issues to the Trading
Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (here-
after, “the Desk”).  The directive contains a statement
of long-run policy objectives and policy instructions
for the immediate future. The directive is intentionally
vague about speciﬁc actions to take, however, leaving
it to the Desk to determine the open market operations
necessary to achieve the FOMC’s objectives.
The current directive instructs the Desk to
achieve a speciﬁc target for the federal funds rate.
Before 2000, the directive also included language
pertaining to possible future changes in the target.
For example, the directive issued on October 5, 1999,
contained the following instructions:
To promote the Committee’s long-run objectives of
price stability and sustainable economic growth,
the Committee in the immediate future seeks con-
ditions in reserve markets consistent with main-
taining the federal funds rate at an average of
around 5-1/4 percent.  In view of the evidence 
currently available, the Committee believes that
prospective developments are more likely to war-
rant an increase than a decrease in the federal
funds rate operating objective during the inter-
meeting period.
This directive speciﬁes no immediate change 
in policy, deﬁned as a change in the Committee’s
objective for the federal funds rate.  The directive is,
however, asymmetric toward a future tightening of
policy.  By contrast, the directive issued at the August
24, 1999, meeting indicated that 
…the Committee in the immediate future seeks
conditions in reserve markets consistent with
increasing the federal funds rate to an average 
of around 5-1/4 percent.  In view of the evidence
currently available, the Committee believes that
prospective developments are equally likely to 
warrant an increase or a decrease in the federal
funds rate operating objective during the inter-
meeting period.
This directive speciﬁes an immediate tightening
of policy, reﬂected in an increase in the federal funds
rate target (from 5 to 5.25 percent), but indicates no
bias, or asymmetry, toward additional tightening or
toward easing in the future.
The FOMC directive has included a speciﬁc target
for the federal funds rate only since August 1997.
Before then, operating instructions were written in
terms of the degree of restraint to be applied to com-
mercial bank reserve positions.  Any asymmetry was
indicated by statements to the effect that different
degrees of restraint “would” or “might” be acceptable
to the Committee depending on the outcome of
some speciﬁed condition(s).  For example, the direc-
tive issued in July 1997 stated:
In the implementation of policy for the imme-
diate future, the Committee seeks to maintain 
the existing degree of pressure on reserve posi-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ST. LOUIS
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tions.  In the context of the Committee’s long-run
objectives for price stability and sustainable econ-
omic growth, and giving careful consideration to
economic, ﬁnancial, and monetary developments,
somewhat greater reserve restraint would or
slightly lesser reserve restraint might be accept-
able in the intermeeting period.  The contemplated
reserve conditions are expected to be consistent
with moderate growth in M2 and M3 over coming
months. (Emphasis added.)
This directive called for no immediate change in
policy, but was biased toward a future tightening.
This bias is indicated by the phrase “somewhat
greater reserve restraint would or slightly lesser
reserve restraint might be acceptable in the inter-
meeting period.”  The bias is toward a tighter policy
because by convention the words “somewhat” and
“would” are stronger than the words “slightly” and
“might.”  Both “somewhat” and “would” need not
appear in the directive to convey asymmetry in one
direction, so long as possible policy changes in the
opposite direction are referred to with weaker lan-
guage (Meulendyke, 1998, pp. 137-38; Ritter, 1993,
pp. 32-33).  Although cumbersome, the directive was
phrased this way to convey the Committee’s intent
while providing sufﬁcient ﬂexibility to implement
policy during the intermeeting period.
Except for replacing the phrase indicating the
desired degree of “restraint on reserve positions”
with explicit reference to an intended federal funds
rate, this form of the directive has been used since
1983.  The speciﬁc language of the operating instruc-
tions portion of the directive has, however, evolved
over time.  Throughout much of the 1980s, operating
instructions were crafted at each FOMC meeting,
with phrases added, deleted, or modiﬁed from one
meeting to the next.  Eventually, the Committee set-
tled on language that could be used in all directives,
so that policy decisions could be conveyed simply by
inserting the appropriate word or phrase into other-
wise standard language.
The Original Intent of Asymmetry
Except for introducing a speciﬁc target for the
federal funds rate, the language used to convey oper-
ating instructions in FOMC directives has changed
little since 1983.  Language to indicate possible
future policy changes was used ﬁrst in the directive
issued on February 9, 1983.  The operating instructions
contained in that directive were worded as follows:
For the more immediate future, the Committee
seeks to maintain the existing degree of restraint
on reserve positions.  Lesser restraint would be
acceptable in the context of appreciable slowing 
of growth in the monetary aggregates to or below
the paths implied by the long-term ranges, taking
account of the distortions relating to the introduc-
tion of new accounts.  The Chairman may call for
Committee consultation if it appears to the Man-
ager for Domestic Operations that pursuit of the
monetary objectives and related reserve paths
during the period before the next meeting is 
likely to be associated with a federal funds rate
persistently outside a range of 6 to 10 percent.
(Emphasis added.)
During the early 1980s, the FOMC grappled with
the challenge of formulating monetary policy when
the growth rates and velocities of monetary and credit
aggregates were behaving unpredictably.  In October
1982, the FOMC changed its operating procedure to
substantially de-emphasize control of the monetary
aggregates, particularly M1.  The FOMC continued to
monitor the growth of the aggregates and set growth-
rate monitoring ranges for M2, M3, and credit, believing
that the aggregates provided useful information for
setting policy.  Several members of the Committee,
however, argued that the aggregates by themselves
were unreliable targets for setting policy in the short
run.  At the FOMC meeting of February 8-9, 1983,
Fed Chairman Paul Volcker stated:  
What I hear around the table … is unanimity on
targeting [money], which is where we were before,
and a lot of ﬂexibility.  I think those are fundamen-
tally incompatible in a conceptual sense…. I wouldn’t
go all the way to targeting interest rates very ﬁrmly
because I think there are targets other than interest
rates that we could adopt instead of monetary tar-
geting…. There are a lot of variables and a lot of
nuances—or more than nuances—of differences 
as to what to do with all these variables.  And how
we condense all that into a directive is the problem.
(Transcript of FOMC Meeting of February 8-9, 1983,
pp. 32-33.)
In formulating policy during early 1983, the FOMC
faced uncertainty about the strength of the ongoing
economic expansion, particularly in the face of threat-
ening ﬁnancial instability associated with debt defaults
by developing countries.  Inﬂation also remained un-
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acceptably high, and despite distortions in the mone-
tary aggregates caused by ongoing deregulation of
depository institution accounts, some FOMC mem-
bers were concerned that rapid money stock growth
would spark even higher inﬂation.  On the other hand,
a few members, more concerned about the outlook
for economic activity than about rapid money growth,
pressed for an immediate easing of policy.  Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City President Roger Guffey,
for example, stated:  “I … suggest that we do want to
cut the rates without regard to the [monetary] aggre-
gates because we have no control over those.  Our
focus should be on the economy and the recovery.”
(FOMC transcript, Feb. 8-9, 1983, p. 85.)  Governor
Henry Wallich disagreed: 
I think it would take a real collapse of the growth
rate of the aggregates to justify reducing interest
rates under present conditions. … If the aggregates
remain half-way strong and the economy expands
moderately, I don’t think that’s the time to reduce
interest rates. (FOMC transcript, Feb. 8-9, 1983, 
p. 85.)
Other members of the Committee split along
these lines as well.
In an effort to craft operating instructions to the
Desk in light of such diverse opinions among FOMC
members, Chairman Paul Volcker suggested intro-
ducing language that called for policy easing during
the intermeeting period if the growth of the aggre-
gates slowed:  
Let me just put on the table an alternative proposal
for the ﬁrst sentence [of the operating portion of
the directive] and at least explore what we want 
to do in substance.  Suppose we just say ‘For the
more immediate future, the Committee seeks to
maintain the existing degree of reserve restraint
expecting that that will be consistent with some
slowing of the aggregates.’  If we want to go further
and consider what would be very nice if it happens,
‘Lesser restraint would be acceptable in the context
of appreciable slowing of growth in the aggregates.’
It leaves open the question of how we quantify this
or whether we quantify it at all in the directive.  I
think what that says is that we don’t want to tighten
up on this next seven-week period as we see it now
and we don’t want to ease up unless the aggregates
turn in a favorable direction.  I would make that
view fairly explicit. (FOMC transcript, Feb. 8-9,
1983, p. 82.)
In response to a request for clariﬁcation, Volcker
explained that his second sentence was not an alter-
native proposal, but rather a contingency:
[This sentence] is not an alternative; it just takes
care of another possibility—a further (action) not
for today.  The ﬁrst [sentence] says we will main-
tain the existing degree of reserve restraint; the
second [sentence] says lesser restraint would be
acceptable in the context of appreciable slowing 
of growth in the aggregates.  That would not be
for today but if the aggregates came in low in the
next three or four weeks, we would ease. (FOMC
transcript, Feb. 8-9, 1983, pp. 82-83.)
The Committee’s discussion then turned to the
criteria that would trigger an easing during the inter-
meeting period.  Some members, particularly those
favoring an immediate easing, argued that policy
actions should not be based on growth of monetary
aggregates.  Most, however, favored basing contin-
gency action at least in part on the behavior of the
aggregates.  Volcker suggested that the contingency
clause could be written as follows:  “lesser restraint
would be acceptable in the context of appreciable
slowing in the growth of the aggregates or signs of
more business weakness...”  (FOMC transcript, Feb. 8-9,
1983, p. 85.)  Eventually, however, the Committee
decided to refer only to growth of the aggregates in
the contingency clause.  Still, general economic con-
ditions were implicit in the Committee’s intentions,
and a substantial slowing of the aggregates would
not necessarily force a policy easing if the economy
continued to expand rapidly.  Volcker stated:  
All that it [the contingency clause] says is lesser
restraint would be acceptable.  I can imagine circum-
stances in which we wouldn’t want to do it because
the economy looks so strong. … I don’t think this
binds us to ease if suddenly the economy were taking
off and these aggregates came in low for a few
weeks. (FOMC transcript, Feb. 8-9, 1983, p. 95.)
One apparent reason for writing a bias towards
ease in the February 1983 directive was to eliminate
any possibility of an intermeeting tightening of mon-
etary policy without another Committee meeting.  It
was Volcker who raised the issue by asking:  “Do we
want, in effect, to foreclose a tightening in the com-
ing weeks?”  According to the transcript of the meet-
ing, several members replied: “Yes” (FOMC transcript,
Feb. 8-9, 1983, p. 86).  A bit later, Volcker stated:
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“Quite explicitly we’re saying we’d be very reluctant
to tighten during these next seven weeks.”  Governor
Charles Partee added:  “As a matter of fact, it says we
won’t tighten.”  (FOMC transcript, Feb. 8-9, 1983, p. 96.)
A ﬁnal question the Committee addressed when
writing asymmetric language into the policy directive
was whether to quantify contingency clauses, for ex-
ample to specify the extent that monetary aggregate
growth rates had to slow in order to trigger a policy
easing.  Governor Lyle Gramley suggested that the
contingency clause should be speciﬁc:  “To put out
an operating paragraph which says, in effect, that we
have some numbers and we’re going to act in accor-
dance with them but we’re not going to tell you what
they are, doesn’t seem like a reasonable way to pro-
ceed.” (FOMC transcript, Feb. 8-9, 1983, p. 92.)  The
Committee decided, however, to follow Governor
Wallich’s suggestion:  “I would not put numbers 
in [the directive] because it’s so uncertain, but I
would refer to the longer-term ranges and say if 
the actual numbers fall signiﬁcantly below most 
of those and we have a collapse in the aggregates
then yes, (we would ease).” (FOMC transcript, Feb. 
8-9, 1983, p. 93.)
The transcript of the February 8-9, 1983, FOMC
meeting provides a fairly clear picture of why asym-
metric language was introduced into the policy directive
and what it was intended to mean.  At that time, FOMC
members held divergent views about the appropriate
targets and short-term goals of monetary policy, and
by deﬁning the conditions that could trigger an inter-
meeting policy action, the asymmetric language seems
to have helped forge agreement between those mem-
bers favoring an immediate easing of policy and those
who opposed easing because of rapid monetary aggre-
gate growth.  Speciﬁcally, the directive indicated that
an explicit easing of policy would be acceptable to
the Committee if the growth of monetary aggregates
slowed.  Presumably, such easing would occur at the
discretion of the chairman, perhaps in consultation
with other ofﬁcials, but would not require a vote of
the full Committee.  Moreover, as Volcker suggested,
the asymmetric language did not compel the Fed to
act even if the stated condition, in this case a slowing
of monetary growth, occurred.  Presumably, subse-
quent directives could issue more speciﬁc instructions
if the Committee felt that the chairman overstepped
his authority or failed to act as the Committee had
intended.  The transcript makes clear, however, that
by including asymmetric language, the Committee
intended to forestall any policy move in the direction
opposite the speciﬁed asymmetry.
OPEN MARKET POLICY UNDER ASYM-
METRIC DIRECTIVES
We now examine quantitatively the history of
FOMC policy actions since February 9, 1983.  The
purpose of this section is to investigate the extent to
which the symmetry of the directive and the Com-
mittee’s behavior was consistent with any of the three
possible interpretations of an asymmetric policy direc-
tive discussed above. 
We begin by identifying the FOMC policy direc-
tive that was in effect on each business day between
February 9, 1983, and November 30, 1999.  We assume
that a directive became effective on the day that the
FOMC voted for it.  In the case of two-day meetings,
the directive always took effect on the second day.  A
policy directive stayed in effect until the Committee
voted on a new directive.2
Our sample includes 4,201 business days.  Of these,
the directive was symmetric on 1,764 days, biased
toward ease on 1,113 days, and biased toward restraint
on 1,324 days.  There were 135 FOMC meetings during
the period and the symmetry of the directive was
changed 59 times.  All but one change was made at a
regularly scheduled FOMC meeting.  The exception
resulted from a Committee conference call on March
20, 1984.  
Policy Actions and the Symmetry 
of the Policy Directive
To investigate the relationship between the sym-
metry of the policy directive and subsequent policy
actions of the Fed, we focus on the FOMC’s target for
the federal funds rate.  Our data, which are printed 
in Appendix B, cover the period February 9, 1983, to
November 30, 1999, and have been widely used by
researchers.3
Care must be taken in interpreting federal funds
rate target changes.  Prior to August 1997, FOMC policy
directives instructed the Desk to maintain, increase,
or decrease the extent of restraint on commercial
bank reserve positions.  In October 1982, the FOMC
adopted a borrowed reserves operating target and
began to measure reserve restraint in terms of the
2 FOMC directives and meeting summaries are published in the Federal
Reserve Bulletin and the Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.  
3 Federal funds rate target changes for the period 1984-93 are from Rude–
busch (1995); data for 1983 were kindly provided by Spence Hilton.  Data for
1994-99 are based on public announcements following FOMC meetings.6 SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2000
REVIEW
level of borrowed reserves.  What we refer to as the
funds rate target was then called the “associated fed-
eral funds rate,” which was deﬁned as the middle of
“the federal funds rate trading area that is expected to
be consistent with the borrowing assumption.” (Stern-
light, 1992, p. 81.)
FOMC meeting transcripts from the early and
mid-1980s make clear that in policy discussions
some FOMC members focused more on the federal
funds rate than on the level of borrowed reserves.
And, over time, the level of borrowings was de-
emphasized in favor of an explicit federal funds rate
target.  While the Fed never formally abandoned its
borrowed reserves operating procedure, Alan Green-
span (1997) states that “increasingly since 1982 we
have been setting the funds rate directly in response
to a wide variety of factors and forecasts.”  Researchers
also contend that the FOMC substantially de-empha-
sized borrowed reserves as an operating target in favor
of the federal funds rate well before 1997 (Muelendyke,
1998; Thornton, 1988).  Hence, we investigate the
relationship between the symmetry of FOMC direc-
tives and the timing and direction of changes in the
federal funds rate target throughout the period we study.
Our data set records 122 changes in the funds rate
target between February 9, 1983, and November 30,
1999.  Some of these changes probably did not reﬂect
changes in the stance of monetary policy, however, but
rather were technical adjustments of the expected
funds rate in response to changes in the demand for
reserves.  An unofﬁcial summary of monetary policy
actions prepared by staff of the FOMC Secretariat
indicates that between 1983 and 1989, only 49 funds
rate target changes were associated with changes in
policy (see Appendix B).  Our data set, by contrast,
contains 87 changes in the intended funds rate during
the period.  Hence, our data may contain as many
as 38 target changes during 1983-89 that are charac-
terized better as technical adjustments reﬂecting
changes in reserve demand than as policy actions.
Because of this possibility, for all hypotheses described
in the paper, we performed test statistics based on
both the full data set, and a data set consisting of just
those target changes described by the FOMC Secretariat
as associated with policy changes.  Qualitatively, none
of our conclusions are affected by the choice of series
on funds rate target changes.
During our sample period there were 135 FOMC
meetings and 59 occasions when the symmetry of
the directive was changed.  Before February 1994,
when the FOMC began disclosing policy actions
immediately upon taking them, most target changes
were made between FOMC meetings.4 Of the 105
target changes made prior to 1994, only nine were
made at regularly scheduled FOMC meetings.5 By
contrast, of the 17 target changes since 1994, 15 were
made at regularly scheduled FOMC meetings; only
two were made between meetings.  Since 1994, the
FOMC routinely has announced its federal funds rate
target.  Data covering the period before 1994 record
target changes as being implemented one day after the
date of FOMC meetings.  For the subsequent period,
target changes are recorded as occurring on the date
of FOMC meetings (on the second day in the case of
two-day meetings).
Changes in the funds rate target and the symmetry
of policy directives in effect at the time of target changes
are summarized in Table 1.  Between 1983 and 1999,
the federal funds rate target was reduced 33 times when
the directive issued at the previous FOMC meeting was
biased toward ease.  The target was lowered 29 times
when the previously issued directive contained no bias,
and it was lowered twice when the directive was biased
toward tightening.  During this period, the funds rate
target was increased six times when the directive
issued at the previous meeting was biased toward
ease, increased 13 times when the directive was
unbiased, and raised 39 times when the directive was
biased toward tightening.
Prior to 1994, the Fed made a number of inter-
meeting funds rate target changes of just 6.25 basis
points.  Such small changes might best be considered
technical adjustments, rather than changes in policy.
The number of target changes listed in parentheses
in Table 1 include only those larger than 6.25 basis
points in absolute value.
Of the 80 target changes we identify as being made
when the directive was asymmetric, only eight target
changes were in the direction opposite that speciﬁed
by the asymmetry of the directive.  All eight of these
appear to have been in response to unexpected changes
4 The Fed began to announce target changes immediately upon making
them at the February 1994 FOMC meeting.  The policy of doing so,
however, was not formally adopted until February 1995.
5 Seventeen target changes are recorded as being implemented one day
after an FOMC meeting during this period.  Of these, nine were con-
sistent with the instructions for immediate implementation issued in
the directive of those meetings.  We treat the remaining eight target
changes as being intermeeting changes.  Of these eight, two (occur-
ring on October 5, 1983, and February 11, 1988) took place when the
instructions called for maintaining the reduced pressure on reserve
positions.  Five others were consistent with the language in the direc-
tive pertaining to bias.  Our results are not affected qualitatively by
whether we treat these eight target changes as occurring on meeting
dates or as intermeeting changes.SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2000       7
in reserve demand and, hence, should be considered
as technical adjustments. 
One of the target cuts was a 6.25 basis point reduc-
tion on July 11, 1985.  The shock to reserve demand
appears to have been temporary because the reduc-
tion was reversed on July 25.  The other reduction
occurred on July 2, 1987, when the funds rate was
cut by 12.5 basis points.  This cut also was reversed,
though not as quickly as the one on July 11, 1985.
The funds rate target was increased to its previous
level on August 27, 1987.
Of the six target-rate increases, three occurred
early in the new operating procedure and in quick
succession on July 20, 1983, July 27, 1983, and August
17, 1983.  The other cases occurred on March 1 and
March 15, 1984, and on January 24, 1985.  All three
appear to have been in response to increased reserve
demand that was not reﬂected in bank borrowing.
For example, according to the Report of Open Market
Operations, which is prepared at the end of each
reserve maintenance period by the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, the March 15, 1984, increase 
of 37.5 basis points reﬂected pressure on reserve
demand and the funds rate associated with “the 
corporate tax date on March 15 and subsequent 
end-of-quarter pressures.”
Unlike the July 11, 1985, and July 2, 1987, target
rate cuts, none of the target increases that were made
when the directive was biased toward ease were tem-
porary.  Indeed, the March 1, 1984, increase was the
ﬁrst of nine consecutive increases, while the increase
on January 24, 1985, was the ﬁrst of four consecutive
increases.  Nevertheless, all of these changes appear
to have been made in response to unexpected changes
in market conditions and may not have reﬂected fun-
damental changes in the stance of monetary policy.
After 1987, no change in the federal funds rate
target was in the direction opposite the asymmetry, if
any, speciﬁed in the policy directive issued at the
previous FOMC meeting.  Hence, historically, when
the FOMC’s policy directive has been asymmetric,
the majority of any policy actions taken have been in
the direction indicated by the asymmetry.  Thus, for
target changes made under asymmetric directives,
the direction of asymmetry nearly always correctly
predicts the direction of the target change.6
Symmetry and Fed Policy Actions
Although the direction of asymmetry signaled
the likely direction of any target changes the FOMC
made under an asymmetric directive, the question
remains whether the Committee was more likely to
change its target when the directive contained asym-
metric language than when it did not.  Asymmetric
directives were in effect on 58 percent of all business
days during our sample period.  If target changes
were more frequent under asymmetric directives, we
should ﬁnd that the probability that directives were 
asymmetric when the Fed changed its target was sig-
niﬁcantly higher than 58 percent.
Of the 122 target changes summarized in Table
1, 80 (65.6 percent) occurred under asymmetric
policy directives.  On eight of these occasions, how-
ever, the target was changed in the direction opposite
the speciﬁed asymmetry.  If these eight changes are
excluded, the percentage of target changes made
when the directive was asymmetric declines to 63.2
percent.  A test of the hypothesis that 63.2 percent is
equal to 58 percent—against the alternative that it is
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ST. LOUIS
Policy Actions and the Bias 
in the Policy Directive
Policy Action Taken
Bias ¯FF* ­FF* Total
Ease 33 (31) 6 (5) 39 (36)
Symmetric 29 (27) 13 (10) 42 (37)
Tight 2 (1) 39 (30) 41 (31)
Total 64 (59) 58 (45) 122 (104)
NOTE:  The table provides the number of open market policy
actions, as reﬂected in changes in the federal funds rate target,
taken under symmetric and asymmetric policy directives.
Numbers in parentheses give the number of such actions in
which the target change exceeded 6.25 basis points.  ¯FF* and
­FF* refer to decreases and increases in the federal funds rate
target, respectively.
Table 1
6 Lapp and Pearce (2000) estimate an ordered probit model of the change
in the funds rate target, which includes the bias in the policy directive
as an independent variable, and ﬁnd that asymmetry in the directive
increases the probability of a target change in the direction of the bias.
They do not test whether target changes are more likely, however,
when the directive is asymmetric.8 SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2000
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higher—yields a test statistic of 1.11, which is not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at the 5-percent level.7
If small target changes of 6.25 basis points are
excluded—along with the eight changes in the direc-
tion opposite the speciﬁed bias—the probability of a
target change, given that the policy directive was
asymmetric, drops to 62.2 percent (61/98).  Because
the total number of target changes is smaller, the rel-
evant test statistic declines to 0.85, which is not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at the 5-percent level.8 Hence,
we do not reject the null hypothesis that the inclu-
sion of asymmetric language in the policy directive
issued at the previous FOMC meeting is independent
of target changes made under that directive.  This
conclusion is insensitive to whether small target
changes (or other “technical” changes) are included
or excluded.
Some observers might argue that the symmetry of
the directive applied only to the intermeeting period
and, hence, not to target changes made at the next
meeting.  Table 2 reports intermeeting target changes
and the symmetry of the policy directive.  Since 1983,
66.3 percent of intermeeting target changes were made
when the directive was asymmetric.  Omitting 6.25
basis-point target changes, and changes made in the
direction opposite the speciﬁed symmetry, reduces the
frequency to 62.2 percent (46 of 74 such changes).
Asymmetric directives were in effect on 58 percent of
intermeeting days.  A test of the null hypothesis that
the true probability is 58 percent yields a test statistic
of 0.72, which is not signiﬁcant at the 5-percent level.
Hence, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the occur-
rence of intermeeting changes in the funds rate target
were independent of whether the FOMC had adopted
an asymmetric directive at its previous meeting.9
Since 1994, the FOMC has disclosed policy actions
immediately upon making them.  There have been
just two intermeeting target changes since then: an
increase of 25 basis points on April 18, 1994, and a
25 basis-point decrease on October 15, 1998.  Conse-
quently, since 1994 the asymmetry of the policy
directive seems to have had little implication for the
intermeeting period.
The relevant question for 1994-99 would seem to
be whether the issuance of an asymmetric directive
at one FOMC meeting increased the likelihood of a
target change at the next scheduled meeting.  This
period (January 1994-November 1999) included 47
FOMC meetings, and the funds rate target was changed
at 15 (31.9 percent) of these meetings.  The language
of the directive issued at the previous meeting was
asymmetric at 23 FOMC meetings, and there were
eight at-meeting target changes when the directive
issued at the previous meeting was asymmetric.  Thus,
the funds rate target was changed at eight of 23 meet-
ings (34.8 percent) at which an asymmetric directive
had been issued during the previous meeting.  Although
the target was changed a bit more frequently at meet-
ings when the directive of the previous meeting was
asymmetric, the difference is not statistically signiﬁ-
cant.  Hence, the occurrence of target changes at
FOMC meetings during this period was statistically
independent of whether the directive adopted at the
previous meeting was symmetric or asymmetric.
SYMMETRY AND THE CHAIRMAN’S
DISCRETION
Another interpretation of asymmetric language
in FOMC directives is that it gave the chairman more
leeway to change the funds rate target without a Com-
Policy Actions Taken During Intermeeting
Periods and the Bias in the Policy Directive
Policy Action Taken
Bias ¯FF* ­FF* Total
Ease 26 (24) 6 (5) 32 (29)
Symmetric 24 (22) 9 (6) 33 (28)
Tight 2 (1) 31 (22) 33 (23)
Total 52 (47) 46 (33) 98 (80)
NOTE:  ¯FF* and ­FF* refer to decreases and increases in the
federal funds rate target, respectively.
Table 2
7 The test is based on the normal approximation to the binomial.  Hence,
the relevant statistic is normally distributed with a mean of zero and
a variance of p(1-p)/n), where p is the proportion of occurrences of the
event and n is the total number of opportunities.  In this case, p=0.58
and  n=114.  If the eight target changes in the direction opposite the
direction of asymmetry are not excluded, the test statistic is 1.693,
which also is not statistically signiﬁcant at 5 percent.
8 Using the data supplied by the staff of the FOMC Secretariat, the test
statistic is 1.051, which again is not signiﬁcant at 5 percent.
9  Eight target changes recorded as occurring on meeting dates were
inconsistent with the directives for immediate implementation adopted
at the meetings on those dates.  Hence, we treat these eight as inter-
meeting changes (see footnote 5).  Our results are not affected quali-
tatively, however, whether we treat these eight changes as occurring
at meetings or between meetings.  Similarly, if we use the data from
the staff of the FOMC Secretariat, the test statistic is 1.062, which
also is not signiﬁcant at 5 percent.SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2000    9
mittee vote than when the directive was symmetric.
The amount of leeway the chairman has during the
intermeeting period, absent an asymmetric directive,
has never been formally established.  Because funds
rate target changes of 25 basis points have been
common (32 of 98 intermeeting target changes were
of this size), however, it seems reasonable to assume
that the chairman can change the funds rate target by
up to 25 basis points during the intermeeting period
when the policy directive is symmetric.  Hence, we in-
vestigate whether target changes larger than 25 basis
points in absolute value occurred more often under
asymmetric directives than under symmetric direc-
tives.  If larger target changes occurred only under
asymmetric directives, we might infer that asymmetry
was used to expand the chairman’s authority to make
intermeeting policy moves.
Since 1983, there were 18 target changes exceed-
ing 25 basis points between FOMC meetings, of which
13 (72 percent) took place under asymmetric direc-
tives.  Two of these changes (on March 15, 1984, and
July 20, 1983) were, however, in the direction oppo-
site the bias speciﬁed in the directive.  Hence, 11 of
18 large intermeeting changes in the direction of any
asymmetry (61 percent) occurred when the directive
was asymmetric.  Because an asymmetric policy
directive was in effect on 58 percent of intermeeting
days, if the size of target changes was independent of
the symmetry of the policy directive, about 58 percent
of large target changes should have occurred on days
when the policy directive was asymmetric.  Hence,
the percentage of large intermeeting target changes
that occurred when the directive was asymmetric was
only slightly higher than chance alone would predict.
It should be noted, however, that all ﬁve large
intermeeting period target changes made since Alan
Greenspan became FOMC chairman in 1987 were
made under asymmetric policy directives.  On the
other hand, since 1994, the Fed has made just two
intermeeting target changes of any size, suggesting
that this use of asymmetric language may have
changed over time.
SYMMETRY AND CONSENSUS BUILDING
The third interpretation of asymmetric language
in FOMC policy directives is that it was used to build
consensus for policy directives under consideration.
Consensus would be desirable if, for example, the
Committee viewed its actions as more effective or
more credible if dissents were rare.  Symmetry might
have been used to build a consensus if, for example,
a majority, but not all, members of the Committee
desired a change in the funds rate target.  Those pre-
ferring no change might have been more willing to
vote with the majority if the directive were sym-
metric with respect to the direction of future policy
actions.  Alternatively, in the event that a majority
desired to maintain the existing target, but some
members preferred a change, a consensus might
have emerged around a directive that maintained the
existing target but introduced asymmetric language
concerning possible future moves.  In either case, the
use of symmetric or asymmetric language might,
conceivably, have resulted in fewer dissents than
would have occurred otherwise.10
These two examples do not cover all possible con-
sensus-building interpretations.  Suppose that all FOMC
members desired to increase the funds rate target,
but a majority desired a 25 basis-point increase while
a minority favored a larger increase.  In this case, a
consensus might have emerged around a directive
that called for an immediate 25 basis-point increase
and asymmetry toward tightening in the future.  Nev-
ertheless, if language regarding symmetry was used 
to form consensus, we might expect to ﬁnd that more
asymmetric directives were adopted at meetings when
the Committee voted to maintain the funds rate target
while more symmetric directives were adopted at
meetings when the Committee voted to change the
funds rate target.  The fact that consensus might in
some circumstances have been forged by adopting
asymmetric language when the target is changed
would tend to bias this test against supporting the
consensus-building hypothesis.
Target changes and symmetry of the policy direc-
tive voted on at meetings in our sample period are
summarized in Table 3.  As before, the number of
changes larger than 6.25 basis points are noted in
parentheses.  Since 1983, there were 70 meetings at
which the target was not changed and an asymmetric
directive was adopted, and 15 meetings when the
target was changed and a symmetric directive was
adopted.  Hence, 85 of 135 policy directives (63.0
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ST. LOUIS
10 Information on dissents by FOMC members between 1983 and 1999,
classiﬁed by the four possible combinations of symmetry and target
changes, are presented in Appendix A.  Because a limited number of
FOMC participants account for a high percentage of all dissents, dis-
sents provide little insight into the consensus-building hypothesis.
Over our sample period, ﬁve individuals accounted for 44 percent of
the 112 dissents and eight individuals accounted for 60 percent of the
dissents.  Governor Martha Seger alone accounted for 15 percent of
all dissents, dissenting at approximately 30 percent of meetings she
attended, despite being a member of the FOMC during just half our
sample period.10 SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2000
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percent) were consistent with consensus building.
The null hypothesis that symmetry of the policy
directive adopted at FOMC meetings was indepen-
dent of the decision to change policy is rejected at
the 5-percent signiﬁcance level.  The relevant test sta-
tistic is 3.01.11 Hence, the evidence supports the
view that the symmetry of the policy directive was
used to build consensus among the members.  This
conclusion is even stronger in light of the fact that the
possibilities considered here do not encompass all
possible cases of consensus building.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Between 1983 and 1999, the FOMC included
language about likely future changes in policy in its
operating directives to the Open Market Trading Desk.
The transcript of the February 1983 FOMC meeting
indicates that asymmetry was created to permit a
change in the Committee’s policy target between meet-
ings if certain conditions were met. The transcript also
makes clear that the Committee intended to preclude
any move in the direction opposite the bias in the
directive before the Committee reconvened.
Our investigation of the use of asymmetric lan-
guage in FOMC policy directives has identiﬁed several
patterns.  First, when the FOMC issued an asymmetric
directive, any policy changes at or before the next
meeting were usually in the direction speciﬁed by
the asymmetric language.  Reductions in the federal
funds rate target, for example, rarely occurred when
the directive issued at the previous meeting was
biased toward a tightening of policy.
We also found that policy changes occurred
somewhat more frequently under asymmetric direc-
tives than under symmetric directives.  For the entire
sample, however, we cannot reject the hypothesis that
the occurrence of either intermeeting or at-meeting
policy actions was independent of whether the direc-
tive issued at the previous FOMC meeting contained
asymmetric language.  Similarly, for the period since
1994, when the Fed began to announce policy actions
immediately upon making them, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the occurrence of policy actions was
independent of whether the directive adopted at the
previous meeting was asymmetric.  In other words, the
adoption of an asymmetric directive at one FOMC
meeting appears not to have affected signiﬁcantly
the probability of a change in the expected federal
funds rate before or at the next meeting.
We found, however, that intermeeting changes 
in the federal funds rate target of more than 25 basis
points were more frequent under asymmetric direc-
tives than under symmetric directives.  Moreover,
under Alan Greenspan’s tenure as chairman, all ﬁve
intermeeting moves larger than 25 basis points were
made under asymmetric policy directives.  After 1993,
however, intermeeting moves were rare, making it 
impossible to draw strong conclusions about asym-
metric language and the chairman’s discretion to
make large changes in the stance of policy without
an FOMC vote.
Finally, we found evidence that asymmetric lan-
guage may have helped forge consensus among FOMC
members for particular policy directives.  Speciﬁcally,
the Committee more frequently adopted asymmetric
directives when it voted not to change the funds rate
target.  Presumably, the use of asymmetric language
held the number of dissenting votes on FOMC direc-
tives below the number that would have otherwise
occurred.  Asymmetric language was developed to
bring together disparate views among FOMC members.
Since the FOMC apparently found it desirable to obtain
consensus for its policy decisions, it will be interesting
to see whether the FOMC will ﬁnd a new method of
forging consensus now that it has abandoned the use
of asymmetry in its operating instructions.
REFERENCES
Greenspan, Alan.  “Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan,”
at the 15th Anniversary Conference of the Center for
11 Eight target changes recorded as occurring on meeting dates were
inconsistent with the directives for immediate implementation adopted
at the meetings on those dates.  Hence, we treat these eight as inter-
meeting changes (see footnote 5).  If they are treated instead as at-
meeting changes, the relevant test statistic is 1.98, which also is
signiﬁcant at the 5-percent level.  Similarly, if we use the data sup-
plied by the staff of the FOMC Secretariat, the test statistic is 2.324,
which again is signiﬁcant at 5 percent.
Policy Actions and the Symmetry of the
Policy Directive at FOMC Meetings
DFF* noDFF* Total Directives
Asymmetric 9 (9) 70 79
Symmetric 15 (15) 41 56
Total 24 (24) 111 135
NOTE:  DFF* and noDFF* refer to FOMC meetings in which the
federal funds rate target was and was not changed, respectively.
Table 3Economic Policy Research at Stanford University, September 5,
1997.  Available at <www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
speeches/1997/19970905.htm>.
Lapp, John S., and Douglas K. Pearce.  “Does the Bias in FOMC
Policy Directives Help Predict Inter-Meeting Policy Changes?”
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking (August 2000, part 1),
pp. 435-41.
Meulendyke, Ann-Marie.  U.S. Monetary Policy and Financial
Markets, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1998.
Ritter, Joseph A.  “The FOMC in 1992:  A Monetary
Conundrum,” this Review (May/June 1993), pp. 31-49.
Rudebusch, Glenn D.  “Federal Reserve Interest Rate
Targeting, Rational Expectations, and the Term Structure,”
Journal of Monetary Economics (April 1995), pp. 245-74.
Sternlight, Peter D.  “Monetary Policy and Open Market
Operations During 1991,” Federal Reserve Bank of New
York Quarterly Review (Spring 1992), pp. 72-95.
Thornton, Daniel L.  “The Borrowed-Reserves Operating
Procedure:  Theory and Evidence,” this Review (January/
February 1988), pp. 30-54.
SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2000      11
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ST. LOUIS12 SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2000
REVIEW
A ppendix A
DISSENTING VOTES ON FOMC DIRECTIVES, 1983-99
FOMC Members and Their Dissenting Votes, 1983-99
DFF* DFF* noDFF* noDFF*
Beginning End of Asym. Sym. Asym. Sym. Total
Governors of Term Term Directive Directive Directive Directive Dissents
Henry C. Wallich 03/08/74 12/15/86 0 0 4 2 6
J. Charles Partee 01/05/76 02/07/86 0 0 0 0 0
Nancy H. Teeters 09/18/78 06/27/84 0 0 2 0 2
Emmett J. Rice 06/20/79 12/31/86 0 0 2 0 2
Paul A. Volcker 08/06/79 08/11/87 0 0 0 0 0
Lyle E. Gramley 05/28/80 09/01/85 1 0 2 0 3
Preston Martin 03/31/82 04/30/86 0 0 4 1 5
Martha R. Seger 07/02/84 03/11/91 1 2 10 4 17
Wayne D. Angell 02/07/86 02/09/94 1 1 4 2 8
Manuel H. Johnson 02/07/86 08/03/90 0 0 0 1 1
H. Robert Heller 08/19/86 07/31/89 0 0 0 0 0
Edward W. Kelley, Jr. 05/26/87 1 0 1 0 2
Alan Greenspan 08/11/87 0 0 0 0 0
John P. LaWare 08/15/88 04/30/95 0 0 6 0 6
David W. Mullins, Jr. 05/21/90 02/14/94 0 0 0 0 0
Lawrence B. Lindsey 11/26/91 02/05/97 0 0 1 3 4
Susan M. Phillips 12/02/91 06/30/98 0 0 0 0 0
Alan S. Blinder 06/27/94 01/31/96 0 0 0 0 0
Janet L. Yellin 08/12/94 02/17/97 0 0 0 0 0
Laurence H. Meyer 06/24/96 0 0 0 0 0
Alice M. Rivlin 06/25/96 07/16/99 0 0 0 0 0
Roger W. Ferguson, Jr. 11/05/97 0 0 0 0 0
Edward M. Gramlich 11/05/97 0 0 0 0 0
Table A1
The FOMC consists of the seven members of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
and the presidents of the 12 Federal Reserve Banks.
All of the governors are voting members, with the
Chairman of the Board of Governors, currently Alan
Greenspan, serving also as chairman of the FOMC.
The president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York is the vice chairman of the FOMC and always 
is a voting member.  The presidents of the Federal
Reserve Banks of Chicago and Cleveland rotate as
voting members on an annual basis.  The presidents
of the remaining Federal Reserve Banks rotate in
groups of three, with each president voting every
third year.  
The members of the Board of Governors and the
presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks during 1983-
99 are listed in Table A1.  The table provides the
number of times each FOMC member voted against,
i.e., dissented, on a monetary policy directive adopted
by the FOMC during this period.  Directives are classi-
ﬁed according to whether they changed the current
federal funds rate target (DFF*), and whether they
were asymmetric with respect to possible future
policy action (Asym.).SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2000       13
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FOMC Members and Their Dissenting Votes, 1983-99
DFF* DFF* noDFF* noDFF*
Beginning End of Asym. Sym. Asym. Sym. Total
District   President of Term Term Directive Directive Directive Directive Dissents
Boston
Frank E. Morris 08/15/68 12/31/88 0 0 1 0 1
Richard F. Syron 01/01/89 03/31/94 0 0 0 0 0
Cathy E. Minehan 07/13/94 0 0 0 0 0
New York
Anthony M. Solomon 04/01/80 01/01/85 0 0 2 0 2
E. Gerald Corrigan 01/01/85 07/19/93 0 0 0 0 0
William J. McDonough 07/19/93 0 0 0 0 0
Philadelphia
Edward G. Boehne 02/01/81 0 0 1 0 1
Cleveland
Karen N. Horn 05/01/82 04/08/87 0 0 0 0 0
W. Lee Hoskins 09/21/87 11/15/91 0 0 4 3 7
Jerry L. Jordan 03/10/92 0 2 5 1 8
Richmond
Robert P. Black 08/06/73 12/31/92 1 0 2 2 5
J. Alfred Broaddus, Jr. 01/01/93 0 1 4 1 6
Atlanta
William F. Ford 08/01/80 10/01/83 0 0 1 0 1
Robert P. Forrestal 12/07/83 01/01/96 0 0 0 0 0
Jack Guynn 01/01/96 0 0 0 0 0
Chicago
Silas Keehn 07/01/81 08/31/94 0 0 0 0 0
Michael H. Moskow 09/01/94 0 0 0 0 0
St. Louis
Theodore H. Roberts 02/01/83 12/31/84 0 0 0 0 0
Thomas C. Melzer 06/01/85 01/31/98 0 1 5 3 9
William Poole 03/23/98 0 0 1 0 1
Minneapolis
E. Gerald Corrigan 08/01/80 12/31/84 0 0 0 0 0
Gary H. Stern 03/21/85 0 0 3 0 3
Kansas City
Roger Guffey 03/01/76 10/01/91 0 0 3 0 3
Thomas M. Hoenig 10/01/91 1 0 0 0 1
Dallas
Robert H. Boykin 01/01/81 01/31/91 0 0 1 3 4
Robert D. McTeer, Jr. 02/01/91 1 1 0 0 2
San Francisco
John J. Balles 09/25/72 02/01/86 0 0 0 0 0
Robert T. Parry 02/04/86 0 0 2 0 2
Table A1 continued14 SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2000
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CHANGES IN THE EXPECTED FEDERAL FUNDS RATE, 1983-99
When the FOMC implemented policy by estab-
lishing targets for the level of borrowed reserves,
FOMC members and staff estimated the level (or
range) of the federal funds rate expected to be con-
sistent with the Committee’s borrowed reserves
target.  Hence, changes in the expected funds rate
during this period could reﬂect either policy changes
or technical adjustments associated with achieving a
given level of borrowed reserves.  The FOMC did
not, however, maintain a strict borrowed reserves
target throughout the period studied here.  At times,
the Committee placed greater emphasis on the fed-
eral funds rate than on the level of borrowed reserves
and, by the early 1990s, the FOMC probably had
largely abandoned the targeting of borrowed
reserves in favor of targeting the federal funds 
rate exclusively.
In this paper, we employ two distinct sets of data
on changes in the expected federal funds rate.  Both
sets are presented below (Tables B1 and B2).  The
information used to construct Tables 1-3 in the text
are derived from data in Rudebusch (1995) for 1984-
93.  These data have been used widely by researchers,
and are based on Manager’s Reports from the Open
Market Trading Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York.  Spence Hilton of the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York provided similar data to us for 1983.
A second, unofﬁcial series on the expected 
federal funds rate associated with FOMC policy
changes during 1983-89 was provided to us by 
staff of the FOMC Secretariat’s ofﬁce.  It also is 
presented below.
Appendix B
Expected Federal Funds Rate and Dates of Changes in Expected Rate
Expected Federal Funds Rate and Dates of Changes in Expected Rate
Expected  Expected Expected
Date of Change Funds Rate Date of Change Funds Rate Date of Change Funds Rate
07/20/1983 9.375 07/11/1986 6.375 01/09/1991 6.75
07/27/1983 9.4375 08/14/1986 6.3125 02/01/1991 6.25
08/17/1983 9.5625 08/21/1986 5.875 03/08/1991 6
08/24/1983 9.5 12/04/1986 6 04/30/1991 5.75
10/05/1983 9.375 04/30/1987 6.5 08/06/1991 5.5
03/01/1984 9.5 05/21/1987 6.75 09/13/1991 5.25
03/15/1984 9.875 07/02/1987 6.625 10/31/1991 5
03/22/1984 10 08/27/1987 6.75 11/06/1991 4.75
03/29/1984 10.25 09/03/1987 6.875 12/06/1991 4.5
04/05/1984 10.5 09/04/1987 7.25 12/20/1991 4
06/14/1984 10.625 09/24/1987 7.3125 04/09/1992 3.75
06/21/1984 11 10/22/1987 7.125 07/02/1992 3.25
07/19/1984 11.25 10/28/1987 7 09/04/1992 3
08/09/1984 11.5625 11/04/1987 6.8125 02/04/1994 3.25
08/30/1984 11.4375 01/28/1988 6.625 03/22/1994 3.5
09/20/1984 11.25 02/11/1988 6.5 04/18/1994 3.75
09/27/1984 11 03/30/1988 6.75 05/17/1994 4.25
10/04/1984 10.5625 05/09/1988 7 08/16/1994 4.75
10/11/1984 10.5 05/25/1988 7.25 11/15/1994 5.5
10/18/1984 10 06/22/1988 7.5 02/01/1995 6
Table B1
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Expected  Expected Expected
Date of Change Funds Rate Date of Change Funds Rate Date of Change Funds Rate
11/08/1984 9.5 07/19/1988 7.6875 07/06/1995 5.75
11/23/1984 9 08/08/1988 7.75 12/19/1995 5.5
12/06/1984 8.75 08/09/1988 8.125 01/31/1996 5.25
12/20/1984 8.5 10/20/1988 8.25 03/25/1997 5.5
12/27/1984 8.125 11/17/1988 8.3125 09/29/1998 5.25
01/24/1985 8.25 11/22/1988 8.375 10/15/1998 5
02/14/1985 8.375 12/15/1988 8.6875 11/17/1998 4.75
02/21/1985 8.5 12/29/1988 8.75 06/30/1999 5
03/21/1985 8.625 01/05/1989 9 08/24/1999 5.25
03/28/1985 8.5 02/09/1989 9.0625 11/16/1999 5.5
04/18/1985 8.375 02/14/1989 9.3125
04/25/1985 8.25 02/23/1989 9.5625
05/16/1985 8.125 02/24/1989 9.75
05/20/1985 7.75 05/04/1989 9.8125
07/11/1985 7.6875 06/06/1989 9.5625
07/25/1985 7.75 07/07/1989 9.3125
08/22/1985 7.8125 07/27/1989 9.0625
08/29/1985 7.875 08/10/1989 9
09/06/1985 8 10/18/1989 8.75
12/18/1985 7.75 11/06/1989 8.5
03/07/1986 7.25 12/20/1989 8.25
04/10/1986 7.125 07/13/1990 8
04/17/1986 7 10/29/1990 7.75
04/24/1986 6.75 11/14/1990 7.5
05/22/1986 6.8125 12/07/1990 7.25
06/05/1986 6.875 12/19/1990 7 
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T a ble B2
Unofﬁcial Staff Interpretations of FOMC Policy Changes
Expected Funds Expected Funds 
Date of Change Rate or Range Date of Change Rate or Range
05/24/1983 8.5-8.75 Early 01/1989 8.875-9
06/23/1983 9 or slightly higher 02/14/1989 9-9.125
07/13/1983 9 or somewhat higher  02/24/1989 9.75-9.875
10/04/1983 9.25-9.5 06/06/1989 9.5-9.625
03/27/1984 10-10.5 07/06/1989 9.25
07/17/1984 11.25 07/27/1989 9
10/02/1984 10.5-10.625 10/19/1989 8.75
11/07/1984 9.5 11/06/1989 8.5






08/01/1985 7.75 or a shade higher
09/06/1985 8
12/17/1985 7.75
03/07/1986 7.25 or a shade higher






04/30/1987 6.5 or somewhat higher















NOTE:  The values for the federal funds rates were developed by the FOMC Secretariat on the basis of its review of FOMC meeting tran-
scripts and other records that are available to the public, currently through 1994.  The funds rates shown in the table for the period
prior to mid-1989 in most cases do not reﬂect a decision by the FOMC to target the rates in question.  They are based on staff judgments
regarding the consensus of the FOMC and should not be viewed as “ofﬁcial” in any sense.  In this paper, we assume that a target change
occurred on each recorded date, including those for which a speciﬁc rate or range was not given, e.g., July 13, 1983.